It has long been argued that the implementation of market-based environmental policy instruments such as environmentally-related taxes and tradable permits is likely to lead to greater technological innovation than more direct forms of regulation such as technologybased standards. One of the principle reasons for such an assertion is that they give firms greater "flexibility" to identify the optimal means of innovating to meet the given environmental objective. Thus, it can be argued that the benefits of (some) market-based instruments can also be true of well-designed performance standards. While the theoretical case for the use of flexible policy instruments is well-developed, empirical evidence remains limited. Drawing upon a database of patent applications from a cross-section of countries evidence is provided for the positive effect of "flexibility" of the domestic environmental policy regime on the propensity for the inventions induced to be diffused widely in the world economy. For a given level of policy stringency, countries with more flexible environmental policies are more likely to generate innovations which are diffused widely and are more likely to benefit from innovations generated elsewhere. And while the focus of this paper is on the specific case of environmental policy, the discussion is equally applicable to aspects of product and labour market regulation which have implications for technological innovation, such as product and workplace safety. JEL Code: Q55, Q56, Q58, O31, O33, O38.
Introduction
It has long been argued that the implementation of market-based environmental policy instruments such as taxes and tradable permits is likely to lead to greater technological innovation than more direct forms of regulation such as technology-based standards, since they give firms the "flexibility" to identify the optimal means of innovating to meet the given environmental objective.
2 While the theoretical case for the use of market-based instruments is well-developed, 3 empirical evidence remains limited. 4 This paper seeks to contribute to the body of evidence which relates to this proposition. In particular, it is argued that the more flexible is an individual country"s environmental policy regime the more likely it is to induce innovations which are able to find markets overseas. The reason for this is intuitive. If more "prescriptive" policies such as technology-based standards are applied, the technology adoption decision is constrained by the precise characteristics of the standard. And unless other countries adopt standards which are equivalent in nature, the innovations induced are unlikely to be acceptable to permitting authorities overseas. This has the potential to fragment markets for innovation along national (or even sub-national) lines. Conversely, more "flexible" market-based instruments are likely to induce innovations which are potentially applicable in a wider variety of policy settings. This reduces commercial uncertainty associated with research and development, and may allow for the realisation of economies of scale.
2 Assuming that the point of incidence of the tax or permit relates directly to the externality to be mitigated.
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Drawing upon a database of patent applications from a cross-section of countries evidence is provided for the positive effect of "flexibility" of the domestic environmental policy regime on the propensity for the inventions induced to be diffused widely in the world economy. A measure of international technology transfer is developed for technologies which relate to the mitigation of air and water pollution and solid waste management. The results of the empirical analysis confirm the positive role of policy flexibility on international technology transfer.
Following this introduction, section 2 provides a discussion of the potential role of regulation in fragmenting markets for innovation. Section 3 describes the data used to measure both technology transfer and policy flexibility. Section 4 provides a description of the empirical model, as well as the results. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications.
Environmental Regulation and Fragmentation of Innovation Markets
While the empirical evidence on the effects of environmental policy on trade in goods and services remains limited and ambiguous, 5 there is reason to expect that differences in environmental policy regimes would have an effect on international trade and foreign direct investment patterns. While some environmentalists have argued that policies should be harmonised in order to avoid such effects, this is unlikely to be welfare-improving. Environmental policies may differ across countries due to both supply (i.e. ecological conditions) and demand conditions (i.e. preferences for environmental quality), and these factors should be reflected in domestic policy regimes if it is to bring about welfare improvements. While there are some arguments for policy harmonisation in certain cases (e.g. imperfect enforcement, transfrontier pollution), economists are more concerned with the potential for domestic environmental policy to be used as a barrier to trade in order to protect domestic industries (see Ederington and Minier 2003 for a recent empirical study). 
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Unfortunately much of the relevant literature in this area has focused on the effects of differences in the stringency of environmental policy, and not on the effects of differences in policy design.
However, it is well-known that different policy instruments will affect the incentives for firms to develop and adopt environmentally beneficial technologies in different ways. In general, a strong case has been made for the use of market-based instruments (e.g. taxes, tradable permits), rather than direct regulation (e.g. technology-based controls, performance standards) in order to induce innovation (see Jaffe et al. 2002 for a review). In particular, it is argued that the rate of innovation under market-based instruments is more likely to be optimal since a greater proportion of benefits of technological innovation and adoption will be realised by the firm itself than is the case for many direct forms of regulation. Moreover, since market-based instruments are not "prescriptive", they are more likely than many types of direct regulation to ensure that the direction of technological change is cost-minimising with respect to the avoidance of damages. However, the stark juxtaposition between market-based instruments and direct forms of regulation is somewhat misleading. Rather it is more helpful to think in terms of vectors of characteristics of different instruments, and what effect each of these characteristics has on innovation. Relevant vectors would include at least the following:
 Flexibility -i.e. does it let the innovator figure out the best way to meet the objective (whatever that objective may be)
 Targeted -i.e. is the point of incidence of the policy directly on the externality or is it on a "proxy" for the pollutant 10 While this may result in an unfragmented market, it does so at the cost of imposing regulations of equal stringency across countries with different ecological conditions and heterogeneous demand for environmental quality. There is no reason to expect that the optimal path of innovation will be induced. Conversely, the use of flexible instruments allows for broad markets for innovation, as well as differentiated levels of stringency. In effect, with flexible instruments the level of stringency determines the size of different national markets, without bringing about market fragmentation. 7
Data construction and interpretation
As noted above, in this study patent data is used to construct a proxy measure of technology transfer.
This is an approach used by Eaton and Kortum (1999) . However, their study uses data from all patent applications, while the focus of this study is on a particular area -environmental technologies. As such it is important to first develop a working definition of environmental technologies which can be applied to patent data.
Patent counts as a measure of environment-related innovation
Patent data have been used as a measure of technological innovation because they focus on outputs of the inventive process (Griliches 1990; OECD 2008) . This is in contrast to many other potential
candidates ( The IPC classes corresponding to the selected "environmental" technologies are identified in two alternative ways. First, we search the descriptions of the classes online to find those which are appropriate (http://www.wipo.int/classifications/ipc/ipc8/?lang=en). Second, using the online international patent database maintained by the European Patent Office (www.espacenet.com), we search patent titles and abstracts for relevant keywords. The IPC classes corresponding to the patents that come up are included, provided their description confirms their relevancy.
When building the datasets, two possible types of error may arise: irrelevant patents may be included or relevant ones left out. The first error happens if an IPC class includes patents that do not bear the desired "environmental" focus. In order to avoid this problem, we carefully examine a sample of patent abstracts for every IPC class considered for inclusion, and exclude those classes that do not 9 consist only of patents related to "environment". The second error -relevant inventions are left outis less problematic. We can reasonably assume that all innovation in a given field behaves in a similar way and hence our datasets can be seen at worst as good proxies of innovative activity in the field considered. However, overall innovative activity may be underestimated and totals may be less reliable than trends. The description of the IPC codes used to build the datasets for this study can be found in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Patent data were extracted from the EPO World Patent Statistical Database (EPO 2008), or PATSTAT, using a search algorithm based on a selection of IPC classes (Table A1 in 
Flexiblity of Environmental Policy
Given the heterogeneity of environmental policy regimes both across countries, and within countries across sectors and impacts (as well as through time), it is difficult to construct a general index of the Specifically, respondents (usually CEOs) were requested to indicate the extent to which they had the freedom to choose different options in order to achieve compliance with environmental regulations.
Respondents were requested to assess the degree of flexibility on a Likert scale, with 1 = offer no options for achieving compliance, 7 = are flexible and offer many options for achieving compliance.
Mean responses for some of the countries included in our sample are provided in Figure 4 . 
Other explanatory variables
For a given level of flexibility, the stringency of environmental policy will determine the size of markets for innovation. As such, it may be necessary to control for differences in the stringency of environmental policy across countries and over time. As found in more general studies of technology transfer, domestic absorptive capacity is an important factor. While the number of scientific personnel or expenditures on R&D in the relevant fields could be used as measures of domestic scientific capacity, in practice the lack of data for many non-OECD countries (even at the macroeconomic level) prohibits the use of such a measure. Therefore, we assume that patent data can also be used to measure absorptive capacity of the recipient country. A count of patented inventions by domestic (i.e. recipient country"s) inventors is included for this purpose. DE  DK  SE  AT  CH  FI  NL  NO  BE  NZ  AU  CA  GB  JP  IS  FR  US  TW  CZ  IE  SI  IT  PT  SK  IL  ES  KR  PL  GR  MX  RO  AR  RU Technologies may only be transferred if they have been developed in the first place. To capture the stock of inventions in source country that are potentially available for transfer elsewhere, a variable is constructed that reflects the number of patent applications by domestic inventors filed in the current or the three previous years. This time span is appropriate given the limitations on international patenting imposed by international patent treaties. 14 Thus, the mode of the distribution of transfer lags is between 1 and 2 years, as expected. It must also be noted that, as in the previous case, the entire stock of inventions in PATSTAT is considered when constructing the variable, including inventions for which no claims for protection have been sought in countries other than that of the priority office. The sign of this variable is expected to be positive.
Finally, differences in the general propensity to transfer patents between countries and over time are captured through the use of a variable which reflects overall duplicate patent applications filed across the whole spectrum of technological areas. This variable should capture all of the more general economic factors which are likely to influence transfer (e.g. common language, geographic distance, commercial relations, strength of intellectual property rights, etc.), but which are not specific to "environmental" innovation. The sign is expected to be positive.
Empirical Model and Results
Our aim is to analyse the relationship between the nature of policy regimes and technology transfer.
To do so, we construct a gravity model which allows us to examine all potential bilateral relations between source and recipient countries. The hypothesis is that, other things being equal, more "flexible" environmental policy regimes are likely to generate innovations with broad potential acceptance in overseas markets. Figure 5 provides a scatter plot of the relationship between the index 14 Lags associated with filing duplicate applications are, in part, determined by the Paris Convention (1883), stipulating that applications abroad must be filed within one year of the date when the initial application was filed (referred to as "priority date"). If the inventor does file abroad within one year, the inventor will have priority over any similar patent applications received in those countries since the priority date. In addition, under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (1970) the applicant may file an international application which allows further 18 months to make any duplicate filings in signatory countries.
20
of the flexibility of environmental policy regimes and the log of "exports" (outflows) of environmental technologies, suggesting a positive relationship, with the correlation coefficient = 0.45 (at <0.001% significance level).
Figure 5. Relationship Between the Flexibility of the Environmental Policy Regimes and 'Exports' (Outflows) of Environmental Technologies
Moreover, countries with more flexible policy regimes are more likely to be able to benefit from inventions developed elsewhere. As such, Figure 6 gives the same information but from the viewpoint of the recipient country. The relationship between the flexibility index and "imports" (inflows) of environmental technologies is positive, with the correlation coefficient = 0.26 (at <0.001% significance level).
Figure 6. Relationship Between the Flexibility of the Environmental Policy Regimes and 'Imports' (Inflows) of Environmental Technologies
Based on the discussion above, the following equation is specified: Our dependent variable is a measure of the number of patents in source country i (the "priority" office)
for which protection has also been sought in recipient country j (the "duplicate" office) in year t. On the right-hand side of the equation, FLEX it and FLEX jt reflect the degree of flexibility of the source and recipient country"s environmental policy regimes, respectively. It is expected that the sign of these variables is positive. Similarly, STRNG it and STRNG jt reflect the degree of stringency of the source and recipient countries" environmental policy regimes. AWWSTOCK it is the available stock of 15 There are 101 source and recipient countries in the sample.
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inventions in environment-related technologies measured as the sum of patent applications invented in the source country during the current and the previous three years. The sign is expected to be positive.
AWWPAT jt is the total number of patent applications for environment-related technologies invented in the recipient country and the expected sign is positive, since increased absorptive capacity should increase transfers. And finally, TOTALTT ijt is the total number of patents which are transferred from source country to recipient country, and sign is expected to be positive. All the residual variation is captured by the error term (ε ijt ). Table 2 gives the basic descriptive statistics for the sample used. Given the count nature of the dependent variable, the equation is estimated as a negative binomial model using maximum likelihood. When it comes to characterization of the differences in policy regimes between the source and recipient countries, the results suggest that countries with more flexible policy measures are both, more likely to be able to "export" their inventions to markets abroad, as well as benefit from inventions already developed elsewhere. The estimated coefficients are positive and highly significant in all models estimated. 18 Moreover, controlling for differences in policy stringency (or not) does not affect the qualitative nature of this finding. We note that the findings are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects (Table 4 ). Convergence problems prevented us from including year fixed effects for the two models with the full sample, as well as country fixed effects. However, country-specific heterogeneity is already controlled for by a number of regressors in the model that vary across individual country. 0.000 0.000 P-values in parentheses, based on robust standard errors. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Conclusions and Policy Implications
In this paper it has been argued that "differentiated" and "prescriptive" technology-based regulations can result in fragmented technology markets, with the potential market for the innovations induced fragmented across different policy jurisdictions. International policy coordination would reduce the potential for such fragmentation. For global public goods (such as mitigation of climate change) such coordination is evident. The European Union"s Emissions Trading Scheme is the most significant example. However, even for greenhouse gas emissions within Europe, this is the exception and not the rule. For many sources there a myriad of differentiated and prescriptive policy measures.
The problem is, of course, more important in the case of local and regional pollutans. Indeed, the imposition of uniform standards across countries with different ecological and economic conditions would not likely be welfare-improving. However, this does not mean that the benefits associated with globalised markets for innovation can not be realised. In effect, it is "flexiblity" of policy regimes (rather than relative stringency) which ensures that markets are not fragmented. Given the risks associated with expenditures on research and development, and the economies of scale required to recover such expenditures, it is important that regulatory regimes not constrain the potential markets for any innovations induced.
This flexibility is primarily a consequence of the point of incidence of different policy measures. Any policy which focuses on the environmental "bad", rather than mandating a particular means of reducing its impact, will provide potential innovators with the flexibility to identify the optimal means of its mitigation. This can include performance standards as well as market-based instruments such as environmentally related taxes and tradable permits. The key is that the policy measure be "technologyneutral" in the sense that innovators have the choice of technology to use to meet a given environmental objective (e.g. SO 2 emission levels, wastewater effluent quality).
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Drawing upon a rich database of patent applications, results on the effects of environmental policy design on the international transfer of environmental technologies have been presented. There appears to be a strong relationship between CEO"s perception of the flexibility of environmental policy regimes in different countries and the spatial scope of diffusion of inventions which are first patented in these countries. These results provide further support for the the use of "flexible" instruments (including market-based instruments) in environmental policy. And while the focus of this paper is on the specific case of environmental policy, the discussion is equally applicable to aspects of product and labour market regulation which have implications for technological innovation, such as product and workplace safety.
